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Abstract—Malicious co-residency in virtualized networks poses
a real threat. The next-generation mobile networks heavily rely
on virtualized infrastructure, and network slicing has emerged
as a key enabler to support different virtualized services and
applications in the 5G network. However, allocating network
slices efficiently while providing a minimum guaranteed level of
service as well as providing defense against the threat of malicious
co-residency in a mobile core is challenging. To address this
question, in our previous work, we proposed an optimization
model to allocate slices. In this work, we analyze the defense
against the malicious co-residency using our optimization-based
allocation.
Index Terms—5G slicing, network slicing, 5G availability, 5G
optimization, slice allocation, co-location
I. INTRODUCTION
Network Slicing has been proposed to cope with the ever-
growing demand for flexibility and scalability in 5G mobile
network [1], [2]. The recent advancements in Network Func-
tion Virtualization (NFV) have enabled next-generation mobile
networks to employ concepts like network slicing to satisfy
diverse requirements from various new applications [3]. The
Next Generation Mobile Network Alliance (NGMN) defined
network slicing as running multiple services with different
requirements such as performance, security, availability, re-
liability, mobility, and cost as an independent logical network
on the shared physical infrastructure [1], [4]. An end-to-end
slice is created by pairing the RAN and core network slice, but
the relationship between both slices could be 1-to-1 or 1-to-M
[5], [6].
One of the key requirements for network slicing is re-
source isolation between different slices [3], [1]. However,
guaranteeing resource isolation between slices that share the
common physical infrastructure is challenging [4]. The sharing
of common physical resources between slices could lead to
information leakage and side-channel attacks [7], [8]. The
side-channel attacks can be used to determine co-residency
and extract valuable information (e.g., cryptographic keys [9])
from the victim slices or perform Denial-of-Service attacks
[10]. There are several types of side-channel attacks that can
be used to determine co-residency by using different shared
resources such as CPU cache, main memory, and network traf-
fic [9]. Therefore, it is paramount to provide defense against
malicious co-residency and minimize side-channel attacks.
In this paper, our focus is to minimize the success rate
of getting a malicious co-residency with a victim slice. We
analyze the impact of optimization-based slice allocation on
malicious co-residency. We also discuss additional measures
that can be taken to further minimize the risk of co-residency
as well as some reactive measures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present the literature review on side-channel attacks and
co-residency. The threat model is presented in section III.
Section IV provides an overview of the optimization model
for 5G network slicing. We discuss our simulation setup in
section V. In the section VI, we discuss our results and lastly,
section VIII, we present our conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
The next-generation mobile networks will have similar
co-residency issues as cloud networks since both networks
share some properties, i.e., shared resources and multi-tenancy.
The work on the co-residency issue in the 5G network is
currently limited due to its infancy. Therefore in this section,
we describe some of the state-of-the-artwork on co-residency
detection in could networks, which would still be applicable
in the 5G network because both networks share virtualized
infrastructure.
Network traffic is one of the shared resources that can
be used to determine co-residency. In [11], A. Bates et al.
used network traffic watermarking to detect co-residency with
the victim. In the proposed scheme, the attacker launches
multiple VM instances called FLOODER that communicate
with the CLIENT, which is outside the cloud network. The
CLIENT sends legitimate traffic to the target (victim) server
that resides inside the cloud network. The FLOODER VMs
flood the network with traffic to cause network delays, and the
CLIENT analyzes these delays to determine which FLOODER
is co-resided with the target server. Another aspect of network
traffic can be exploited by analyzing Round Trip Time (RTT)
to detect co-residency. Such a method is discussed by A.
Atya et al. in [7]. In the proposed work, TCP handshake is
used to measure the RTT (in some cases, ICMP was also
be used) to determine co-residency. RTT is calculated from
multiple sources and vantage points to increase the accuracy
of detecting co-residency. A migration scheme was proposed
to defend against co-residency attacks. An extension of their
work is also discussed in [12].
CPU cache-based side-channel attacks are commonly used
to detect co-residency with the victim VM. Authors Y. Zhang
et al. [13] used L2 cache to detect co-residency in the cloud
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environment. The objective of their works was to use side-
channel to detect undesired co-residency. The basic idea of
HomeAlone was to coordinate with other friendly VMs and
analyze the cache usage to determine if there are any undesired
VMs hosted on the same hypervisor.
III. THREAT MODEL
Assumptions: Our threat model assumes that network slic-
ing is supported by the target network, the Evolved Packet
Core (EPC) supports migration of the slice components, the
slice operator or users can migrate the slice(s), on the servers,
multi-tenancy is supported by the slice operator, adversaries
do not know about the operators’ allocation scheme, and
adversaries can successfully determine the co-residency with
the victim slice.
Adversary: The adversaries can launch multiple VMs and
check for the co-residency with the victim. If co-residency is
found then, the attacker could launch the next attack(s). If not,
remove the slice and launch new ones and repeat the process.
We assume that adversaries are not colluding.
IV. OPTIMIZATION MODEL
In our previous work [10], we proposed an optimization
model to mitigate DDoS attacks. The proposed model miti-
gated DDoS attacks using intra-slice (between slice compo-
nents) and inter-slice1 (between slices) isolation. In addition
to providing defense against DDoS, it can optimally allocate
slices. Our model allocated slices to the least loaded2 servers
and finds the minimum delay path (Eq. 1). The optimization
model also fulfills several requirements of the 5G network. It
can guarantee the end-to-end delay and provide different levels
of slice isolation for reliability and availability as well as it
assures that allocation does not exceed the available system
resources. In our model, we only considered CPU, bandwidth,
VNF processing delay, and link delay. Intra-Slice isolation
could increase the availability of a slice. If all components of
the slice are hosted on the same hypervisor, any malfunction
could result in the slice unavailability. However, different
levels of intra-slice isolation can ensure that full or partial
slice remains available.
A summary of the optimization model presented in [10]
is provided here for better readability. More details can be
found in [10]. We use an undirected graph Gp = (Np, Lp)
to represent the physical 5G core network topology. All the
nodes in the network (i.e. servers, switches, routers and other
devices present in the network) are represented by Np, and
Lp denotes all the physical links between the nodes. A slice
request is denoted by a directed graph Gv = (Nv, Lv),
where Nv = (Nc ∪Nd) contains all the slice virtual network
functions, the control and data plane virtual functions are
represented by Nc and Nd, respectively and Lv represents
requested links. Each edge in the directed graph is represented
1Please note that in this paper we did not consider the inter-slice isolation
2All servers have same max. CPU capacity so least loaded is also least
utilized
by (i, j) ∈ Lv . Each slice request is associated with end-to-
end delay (dE2E), intra-slice isolation (Kcrel,K
d
rel), and each
VNF in a slice is associated with a computing demand (Ri),
and bandwidth (BW) requirement between VNF i and VNF j
(Rij). The description of all variable is provided in table I.
TABLE I: Variable Description
Parameter Description
Np Set of physical Nodes
Lp Physical links between nodes
σk Current CPU allocation of physical node k
σef
Current BW allocation of physical link
between nodes e, f
σmaxk Maximum CPU capacity of physical node k
σmaxef
Maximum BW capacity of physical link
between nodes e, f
Tef Physical link delay between node e, f
∆k Physical node k processing delay
∆i VNF i processing delay
Nc Requested set of slice control plane functions
Nd Requested set of slice data plane functions
Nv Requested set of slice VNFs (Nc ∪Nd)
Lv Requested virtual links of a slice
Ri Requested CPU resource by a VNF i
Rij Requested BW resource between VNF i, j
dE2E Requested End-to-End delay
Kcrel Requested intra-slice isolation for Control Plane
Kdrel Requested intra-slice isolation for Data Plane
uik Indicates the assignment of VNF i to EPC node k
yijef
Indicates the assignment of link (e, f)
for VNF graph edge (i, j)
Minimize∑
i∈Nv
∑
k∈Np
(
σk +R
i
)
uik +
∑
(i,j)∈Lv
∑
(e,f)∈Lp
(e 6=f)
Tefy
ij
ef (1)
The objective function of our optimization model (eq. 1)
allocates the slice to least loaded physical nodes and find
minimum delay path. The first term will assign the slice
request to the least loaded servers. The second term will find
the minimum delay path.
The objective function is subjected to several Mixed-Integer
Linear Programming (MILP) constraints.
1) Slice Assignment, Placement and Resource Budget∑
k∈Np
uik = 1 ∀i ∈ Nv (2)
∑
i∈Nv
(
Ri + σk
)
uik ≤ σmaxk ∀k ∈ Np (3)
∑
(i,j)∈Lv
(Rij + σijef )y
ij
ef ≤ σmaxef ∀(e, f) ∈ Lp (4)
∑
i∈Nv
Ri ≤
∑
k∈Np
(σmaxk − σk) (5)
∑
f∈Np
(e 6=f)
(
yijef − yijfe
)
=
(
uie − uje
)
i 6= j,∀(i, j) ∈ Lv,∀e ∈ Np
(6)
uik ∈ {0, 1} ∀k ∈ Np,∀i ∈ Nv (7)
yijef ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ Lv,∀(e, f) ∈ Lp (8)
The constraint (2) ensures that each VNF is assigned to
an exactly one server. Constraints (3) and (4) guarantee
that allocated VNF resources do not exceed the phys-
ical servers’ processing capacity and link bandwidth,
respectively. A slice CPU demand should not exceed
the remaining CPU capacity of the entire system. This
is ensured by constraint (5) since partial allocation of
a slice is not the desired behavior. The conservation
of flows, i.e., the sum of all incoming and outgoing
traffic in the physical nodes that do not host VNFs
should be zero is enforced by the constraint (6), and
this constrains also ensures that there is a path between
VNFs. Constraints (7) and (8) ensures that uik and y
ij
ef
are binary and integer, respectively.
2) End-to-End Delay:
∑
(i,j)∈Lv
∑
(e,f)∈Lp
e 6=f
Tefy
ij
ef +
∑
i∈Nv
∆i + ∑
k∈Np
∆ku
i
k
 ≤ dE2E
(9)
Tef =
σef
σmaxef
δ + Tef,init ∀(e, f) ∈ Lp (10)
Constraint (9) guarantees end-to-end delay for a slice in
the current network state. End-to-end delay includes link
delay, VNF processing delay, and physical node process-
ing delay. Each time when a virtual link (i, j) ∈ Lv is
assigned to a physical link (e, f) ∈ Lp, it increases Tef .
Tef is a function of link utilization, and it is calculated
using eq. (10), where Tef,init is the initial delay assigned
to the link (e, f) ∈ Lp and δ is the maximum increase
in delay.
3) Intra-Slice Isolation∑
i∈Nc
uik ≤ Kcrel ∀k ∈ Np,Kcrel = 1, 2, 3... (11a)∑
i∈Nd
uik ≤ Kdrel ∀k ∈ Np,Kdrel = 1, 2, 3... (11b)
It might be required to have different levels of intra-slice
isolation for control and data plane. In constraints (11),
Kcrel and K
d
rel ensure the intra-slice isolation for control
plane and data plane, respectively. Intra-slice isolation
can improve the availability of a slice.
V. SIMULATION SETUP
MATLAB is used to calculate the optimization solution
and perform pre/post-processing of data. The preprocessing of
data involves reading current network topology, slice requests,
Fig. 1: Simulation Topology
and updating the optimization model. In the post-processing,
we update the network topology after a slice is allocated.
AMPL is used to model optimization algorithm, and CPLEX
12.9.0.0 is used as a MILP solver. The optimization model is
evaluated on Intel Core i7-8700 3.2 GHz with 32 GB RAM.
We simulate 200 servers as shown in Fig. 1 (we used similar
topology to [14]). Other parameters used for the evaluation
are listed in Table II. In our simulation, we vary the level of
intra-slice isolation using the Krel parameter. This parameter
provides the upper limit for how many VNFs can be placed
on one physical server. For Krel 1 to 10, all slices request the
same level of intra-slice isolation. The average overall CPU
utilization of the entire system is also restricted at 50%, 75%,
80%, 85%, 90%, and 95% (±∆0.5%). For each average CPU
utilization (ACU), we vary the Krel (e.g., at average CPU
utilization 50%, Krel will be varies from 1 to 10).
TABLE II: Simulation parameters
Parameter Value
Np 200
σmaxk 25 GHz
Krel 1-10
Nv 10
Rij 40-60 Mbps
Ri 0.55-1.6 GHz
∆i 0.2-0.6 ms
∆k 0.2 ms
δ 3.5 ms
Tef , init 0.13 ms
Total Attacker Slice Requests 500
Target Slice 50
In each simulation, the attacker requests allocation of a slice
and determines if there is a co-residency with the victim slice
(i.e., one or more VNFs of the victim slice are allocated on
the same hypervisor as the attacker). If co-residency is found,
it is considered as a success (we assume that attacker will
move to the next step of their objective in the real world), and
if no co-residency is found then, it is considered as failure.
In either case, we deallocate the attacker slice and request a
new slice. We repeat this process 500 times and calculate the
average success rate. The success is defined as if one or
more VNFs of a victim slice are allocated on the same
hypervisor as the attacker. We only generate 500 attacker
requests once at the beginning of the simulation. To simulate
a more realistic scenario, every 60 seconds a legitimate slice
is deallocated, and a new slice is allocated. The target slice is
never deallocated.
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
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(a) ACU 50% (b) ACU 75%
(c) ACU 80% (d) ACU 85%
(e) ACU 90% (f) ACU 95%
Fig. 2: Comparison of Co-Residency Success rate for different
average CPU utilization
Fig. 2 shows the relationship between different levels of
intra-slice isolation and the success rate of getting a co-
residency with any network function of the target slice. In
the figure, there is a relatively higher chance of getting co-
residency when Krel ≤ 3 and lower ACU because of two
reasons. First, at Krel ≤ 3, the network functions are more
spread across the network, which increases the chances of
getting co-residency with a specific target slice. Second, at
relatively lower ACU3 there are more opportunities to get co-
allocation. Whereas at higher Krel ≥ 4 and ACU ≥ 80%,
we see a significant decrease in the success rate of getting a
co-residency. For instance, Krel = 1 and ACU = 75%, the
success rate is 56% whereas Krel = 1 and ACU = 80%, the
success rate is only 29% (almost 50% reduction in success
rate). At Krel ≥ 4, the slice would have a certain degree of
isolation as well as at ACU > 75 present a more realistic
scenario for the slice operator because the network resources
will be better utilized. Please note that a detailed analysis
of the optimization model’s performance and efficiency is
presented in [10], [14].
VII. DEFENSE
There are few methods that can be employed to reduce the
threat of malicious co-residency.
3ACU < 50% does not yield meaningful results due to low resource
utilization. Therefore, we have not shown those results here
• Migrate the target slice to a different location (hypervi-
sor). It could be a slice operator or the user (if allowed)
that can migrate the slice.
• Detect anomalous behavior for slice allocation requests
(e.g., monitor IP/MAC/unique user ID or some other
parameters) and take necessary preventive measures.
• Limit the number of slice requests allowed perusers
within a specified period and the total number of requests.
• Randomize the time between slice requests and creation,
thus making it harder to infer the allocation scheme.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an analysis of the impact of
optimization-based slice allocation on malicious co-residency.
Our optimization model inherently provides a proactive de-
fense against malicious co-residency. The success rate of
getting co-residency with the target slice decreases with the
increase in Krel levels and Average CPU Utilization of the
system. The selection of Krel depends on several factors, i.e.,
cost, security, and performance. For instance, if a slice requires
higher level of DDoS protection then lower Krel might be
required to provide high availability (e.g., Krel = 1). Whereas
to reduce the cost and the risk of malicious co-residency, a
slice might require higher Krel (e.g., Krel ≥ 4). Another
factor that could impact the selection of Krel is the state of the
slice operator’s network4 (e.g., ACU). Therefore, the selection
of Krel greatly depends on the requirements of a slice and
state of the operator’s network. The natural defense against
malicious co-residency comes at no additional computational
cost to the network operator since the cost is already included
in the slice allocation.
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